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The "Inurement of Earnings to Private
Benefit" Clause of Section 501(c):
A Standard Without Meaning?
Section 501(c) of the InternalRevenue Code requires of
several of the enumerated tax-exempt organizationsthat
no part of their net earningsinure to an individual'sprivate benefit. The author of this Note traces the legislative
history and the Judicial development of the "benefit"
clause to determine what Congress and the courts are
actually attempting to achieve. He concludes that in ap-plying the benefit clause to deny exemption to organizations because of the manner in which they acquire or distributetheir earnings,courts have ignored the underlying
purpose of the section 601(c) exemption. The result in
one class of cases has been to invoke the benefit clause
to decide cases to which it was never intended to apply;
in another,to obscure the fact that a denial of exemption
under the benefit clause represents a conclusion rather
than the applicationof a standard.
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code exempts certain organizations from income tax.' Among the various qualifications
for several of these organizations is the requirement that no part
of their net earnings inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. The courts have purported to apply this requirement to two different classes of cases: first, where the conduct of
the organization's tax-exempt purpose results in benefit to individuals; and second, where the organization conducts profit-maling
activities that are not related to its tax-exempt purpose. This
Note will examine, in light of the objectives and limitations of the
exemption, the legislative history and judicial interpretation of
this requirement and determine the significance of the benefit
qualification.
1. Ir. Mv.CODE OF 1954, § 501.
2. IThr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 501(C)(3) (religious, charitable, scientific,

literary, educational, etc., organizations), (4) (local associations of employees),
(6) (business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, and boards
of trade), (7) (clubs), (9) (voluntary employees' beneficiary associations), (10)
(federal governmental employees' voluntary beneficiary associations), (11)
(ocal teachers! retirement fund associations), (13) (cemetery corporations),
(17) (supplemental unemployment compensation trusts); see Tress. Reg. §
1.501(c)(5)-1 (1958) (abor, agricultural, and 'horticultural organizations).
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I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY -OF THE BENEFIT CLAUSE
The present language of section 501, "that no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private individual
or shareholder," originated in the corporation excise tax of 1909.1
The bill, as reported by the Senate Committee on Finance, imposed a tax upon "every corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock represented
by shares . . . "'
The bill thus implicitly granted exemption to any corporation
that was not organized for profit or had not issued capital stock.
The meaning of "organized for profit" was unclear, however, and
troubled a number of senators. Although the bill's supporters
axgued that the language served to exempt religious, charitable,
and educational organizations ' and fraternal beneficiary societies,"
many senators remained unconvinced. Senator Augustus 0. Bacon
offered an amendment to exempt from tax "any corporation or association organized and operated for religious, charitable, or educational purposes, no part of the profit of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual, but all of the profit of
which is in good faith devoted to the said religious, charitable, or
educational purpose."' 7 When asked why he did not believe that
these organizations were covered by the "organized for profit"
language, Senator Bacon replied that he had in mind an organization known as the Methodist Book Concern, "which is a very large
printing establishment, and in which there must necessarily be
exclusively for religious, benevolent, charitable,
profit made
and educational purposes, in which no man receives a scintilla of
individual profit."' He argued that such an organization "is organized for profit, but it is not organized for individual profit. It is
orgamzed to make a profit to extend religious work, and to extend
benevolent work, charitable work, and educational work."'
3. Tariff of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112.
4. 44 CoNG. REc. 3836 (1909).
5. 44 CoNG. Rsc. 4151 (1909) (remarks of Senator Flint).

6. 44

CONG. REC. 3938 (1909) (remarks of Senator Flint). An additional

burden nposed upon fraternal beneficiary societies by the committee bill was
to show that they were not actually mutual insurance companies. The committee, without specifically referring to such societies, had apparently assumed
that they would not ,betaxable as insurance companies because their insurance
activities constituted a mere incident to their fraternal and charitable purposes. Ibid.
7 44 CoNG. REc. 4037 (1909).

8. 44 CoNG. REc. 4151 (1909).

9. Ibid.
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These statements do not clearly indicate whether Senator Bacon believed that the Methodist Book Concern should be exempt
because its sale and distribution of reading materials alone constituted the performance of educational, religious, and charitable
functions or because the profits derived from this activity were devoted exclusively to the support of such functions. His emphasis
on the manner in which profits were distributed and his concession
that the Book Concern was "organized for profit" indicate that
he was concerned primarily with the distribution of income- so
that the clause of his amendment "organized and operated for religious, charitable or educational purposes" referred to the use of
income rather than the manner in which income was obtained. In
any event, the substance of Senator Bacon's amendment was enacted, with minor changes?
Similar concern was expressed as to whether the bill exempted
building andloan associations. Although the bill's manager argued
that it did since "a corporation that divides its earnings among its
members is [not] a corporation for profit,"" Senator Bacon moved
that building and loan associations "organized and operated exclusively for mutual benefit, and no part of the profit of which
inures to the benefit of any private individual"'" be expressly exempted. Immediately after proposing this amendment, however,
Senator Bacon stated that he thought "it would be sufficient just
to say 'organized and operated exclusively for mutual benefit,' and
[he would] offer the amendment in that way."' 3 In that form the
amendment passed.' 4 Apparently Senator Bacon recognized that
the clause dealing with the purposes of organization and operation
effectively restricted the use of profit and obviated any necessity
for an "inurement to benefit" clause. One may only speculate why
he did not reach the same conclusion with respect to the exemption of religious, charitable, and educational organizations. In fact,
he did not, and the result has been a proliferating use of the bene10. 36 StaL 113 (1909). The word "exclusively" was inserted after "organzed and operated," and the clause requiring all profit to be "in good faith"
devoted to religious, charitable, or educational purposes was deleted, in all
likelihood because it was redundant.
11. 44 CONG. REc. 3939 (1909) (remarks of Senator Flint). President Taft,
however, apparently believed that building and loan associations were organized for profit, for in -his original recommendations he proposed to impose a
tax upon all corporations and joint stock companies for profit, except national
banks, savings banks, and building and 'loan associations. 44 CoNG. REc. 334445 (1909), printed in S. Doc. No. 98, 61st Cong., 1st Sess. (1909).
12. 44 CoNG. REc. 4153 (1909).
13. 44 CoNG. Ec. 4154 (1909).
14. 36 Stat. 113 (1909).
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fit clause throughout the exemption provisions of the income tax
laws 5 and a reliance upon it by courts as a ground for denying
exemption.
II.PRIVATE BENEFIT INFERRED FROM DESTINATION
The "inurement to benefit" clause of section 501(c) denies exemption to organizations whose net earnings inure to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual.10 The Treasury Regulations define a "private shareholder or individual" as a person "having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization.' 1 7 An early Treasury ruling 8 containing a more definitive
discussion of the phrase involved a private school, all of whose
stockholders were active in its management and received dividends
from net earnings. The school contended that the word "private"
was introduced into the statute to distinguish between managing
and investing stockholders. The Treasury, however, ruled that
"private" was designed to distinguish between one who is benefited by earnings that inure incidentally to, or in satisfaction of,
the organization's tax-exempt purpose and one who is benefited
in any other - private - capacity. This construction of the statute appears preeminently reasonable; since every organization
presumably is organized and operated to benefit certain individuals or groups, the only apparent way to distinguish between exempt and nonexempt organizations on the basis of their use of
earnings is whether a particular use is consistent with the purposes
upon which exemption is founded. 0
15. See note 2 8upra.
16. See the sections of INT. REV CODE OF 1954 cited m note 2 supra.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (1958).
18. T.B.R. 33, 1 Cu . BuLL. 199 (1919).
19. It 1has frequently 'been said that net earnings inure to the private benefit of members of social clubs where they result in the maintenance of a level
of club facilities and services notwithstanding a reduction in dues, or in a
lugher level of facilities and services without a corresponding increase in dues.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 589, 1958-2 Cum. BuLm. 266, 267. The difficulty with this
test is that it could 'be met only if the net earnings were never used.
One court has used the following language to put the matter in perspective:
"[T]hough every improvement in a charitable institution confers additional
benefits on those using it, or availing themselves of its benefits, such benefits
have never been considered as taking the institution out of the class of charitable institutions because it has enabled it to do better educational, literary or
charitable work, or because it resulted in distributing its benefits among
private shareholders or individuals." United States v. Proprietors of Social Law
Library, 102 F.2d 481, 484 (1st Cir. 1939). Of. Hutterische Bruder Gemcinde, 1
B.T.A. 1208 (1925) (determination that taxpayer was not operated for religious
purposes, partly on ground that earnings inured to benefit of members beyond
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Thus, the conferral of private benefit would appear to be wholly
a definitional conclusion from a necessarily prior determination
that the organization's income had been used in a manner inconsistent with the purpose upon which its exemption rested. The
Treasury Regulations inversely recognize this logic: An organization that confers private benefit
has departed from operation ex20
clusively for exempt purposes.
This peculiar relationship between purpose and private benefit
results in making the meaning of private individual, shareholder,
or member in any given case depend upon the scope of the exempt
purpose.2 ' Thus, a recent Treasury ruling held labor organizations
exempt notwithstanding that they had established death, sick, and
accident funds for the benefit of their members - the betterment
of the condition of labor union members in this manner was one of
the purposes for which the organization was granted exemption*
Conversely, the expenditure of funds by an automobile club in aid
of the war effort was held to defeat exemption because the club
had conferred a benefit beyond the scope of its exempt purpose it was not the exempt purpose of the club to benefit the entire
country. 3 Both of these decisions implicitly recognize that to accomplish the exempt purpose an organization must necessarily
confer a benefit and that the important question is whether the
benefit is within the scope of the purpose.
the scope of rligious purposes); Rev. Rul. 78, 1962-1 Cum. BuLL. 86 (propriety of distribution of income dependent upon basis of organization's exemption). Arguably the statement in Social Law Library would make equally
good sense if any other tax-exempt purpose were substituted for "charitable."
But see Part MIof this Note, infra.
20. See Tress. Reg..§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (1958); cf. Spokane Motorcycle
Club v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 151, 153 (ED. Wash. 1903) (plaintiff
"may have been operated for exempt purposes provided all of the funds
realized as net profits were used for exempt purposes...

21. See Rev. Rul.304, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL. 306.
22. Rev. Rul. 17, 1962-1 Cum. BuTL. 87, revoking Rev. Rul. 143,
1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 239. The absence of private benefit, although not specifically required by statute for the exemption of labor organizations, see ;'T. REv.
CoDE OF 1954, § 501(c)(5), is required by Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-I (1958).
2S. Smyth v. California State Auto. Ass'n, 175 Fad 752 (9th Cir. 1949).
See also Keystone Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 181 F-ad 402 (3d Cir. 1950).
Where death, sick, and accident payments are made to members of a club, the
club is held nonexempt on the ground that the payments are beyond the scope
of exempt club purposes and hence constitute the inurement of earnings to private benefit. Polish Army Veterans Post 147 v. Commissioner, 236 F2d 509
(3d Cir. 1956); Allied Trades Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 900 (Sd
Cir. 1956); Spokane Commercial Travelers v. Squire, 126 F. Supp. 424 (WD.

Wash. 1954).
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A similar problem of deducing the scope of the exempt purpose
arises frequently with respect to trusts and foundations seeking
exemption under section 501(c) (3). For example, a trust or foundation that primarily benefits a relatively small group of individuals,
such as the members of the settlor's or founder's family, in all
probability will be denied exemption.2 4 On the other hand, an incorporated law library was held to be an exempt "educational institution" notwithstanding that its use was restricted to certain
governmental officials and dues-paying subscribers. 2 5 Whether exemption is denied or granted in cases such as these would seem to
depend entirely upon the construction given the words "charitable," "educational," etc., by means of which the statute defines
exempt purpose. From that construction will follow automatically
the determination whether earnings have inured to private
benefit."6
A problem that has particularly vexed the courts is that of an
individual who reserves the right to receive specified annuities
from an otherwise clearly exempt organization created by him.
The courts have rejected a categorical approach in this area because of their reluctance either to deny exemption to bona fide
charitable organizations merely because the founder has reserved
relatively small annuities or to exempt income received by the
founder from a private investment. 27 Instead, they have held organizations exempt2 s or nonexempt" largely on the basis of their
24. See United States v La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle,
152 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 793 (1946) (use of income
to provide members inexpensive medical treatment not in fulfillment of caritable purpose); Amy Hutchison Crellin, 46 B.T.A. 1152 (1942); Rice & Rice,

Charitable Foundations and the Federal Income Tax, The Year Book of the
Selden Society, Feb., 1948, p. 16. However, exemption has been granted, presumably on the basis of a finding of charitable purpose, where a foundation
was established to provide financial relief to the employees and their families
of a particular employer, so long as employee contributions represented only
a minor portion of the orgamzation's revenue. See G.C.M. 10028, 1937-2 Curr.
Buu_. 125. But cf. C. R. Lindback Foundation, 4 T.C. 652, aff'd, 150 F.2d
986 (3d Cir. 1945).
25. United States v Proprietors of Social Law Library, 102 F.2d 481 (Ist
Cir. 1939); cf. Rev Rul. 403, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 307 (exemption granted
scholarship foundation whose beneficence was restricted to members of particular fraternity).
26. Cf. Harrison v Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1937).
27. See 34 VA. L. REv 225, 226 (1948).
28. See Lederer v Stockton, 260 U.S. 3 (1922); Edward Orton, Jr., Ceramic Foundation, 9 T.C. 533 (1947), aff'd, 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949). But
see Home Oil Mill v Willingham, 68 F Supp. 525 (N.D. Ala. 1945).
29. See Scholarship Endowment Foundation v Nicholas, 106 F.2d 552
(10th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 623 (1940); The Davenport Founda-
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"dominant purpose," as determined by the size of the annuity reserved in relation to the size of the gift. Although this standard
appears to conflict with the requirement of an "exclusive" exempt
purpose,30 the two might be compatible where the charter or trust
instrument does not require payment of the annuity from net
earnings but places a charge upon the property in reduction of the
gift which the exempt organization must pay to enjoy the remainder.3 ' This drafting technique would not, however, be likely to
persuade a court to grant exemption where an amount of principal
equal to the bulk of the income is payable in annuities to the settlor or founder for a substantial period of time 2
In addition to the questions presented by current distributions
of earnings, the courts have also been confronted with the problem
of determining how to treat an organization whose charter or bylaws or the statute under which it was created permits distributions out of current or accumulated earnings or appreciated assets
at some time in the future or at dissolution. Early Treasury rulings, emphasizing that the organizations under consideration were
neither organized nor operated with the expectation of dissolution,
held that the mere possibility of distribution at dissolution was
too remote to constitute a basis for denying tax exemption.s
Although courts have, as a general rule, adopted this reasoning."
tion, 1947 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 47341; Roger L. Putnam, 6 T.C. 702
(1946).
30. Arguably, the "exclusive" requirement ought to be applied literally
when the question is distribution of earnings, but not when the question is
operation of a trade or business. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(S)-l(c)(1)

(1958), -with Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (1958). "Exclusive" has gener-

ally been interpreted to mean "primary" in cases involving the operation of a
trade or business as opposed to the conferral of benefit. See Debs Memorial
Radio Fund, Iac. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1945), reversing 3
T.C. 949 (1944); Unity School of Christianity, 4 B.TA. 61 (1926).
31. Cf. Edward Orton, Jr., Ceramic Foundation, 9 T.C. 583 (1947), aff'd,
1-73 F2d 488 (6th Cir. 1949); The Davenport Foundation, 1947 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. Dec. 47341.
32. Cf. Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 106 F.2d 55(10th Cir.), cert. denied; 308 U.S. 623 (1989).
3. S.M. 2710, 1T--2 Cum. Buia,. 280 (1924) (social club); I.T. 1906, 111-1
Cumr. BuL. 270 (1924) (private preparatory school; apparently overruling O.D.
293,1 Cum. BulL. 201 (1919)); S. 958, 1 Cum. B c. 202 (1919) (country club).
But cf. Rev. Rul. 589, 1958-2 Cum. Bur. 266, 267; A.RI. 86, 2 Cum. Buu,.
208 (1920) (corporation organized to -hold title to land and buildings and operate
thereon a chautauqua for religious, educational, and recreational purposes was
held nonexempt because the shareholders, in the event of dissolution, would
benefit from the distribution of appreciated assets and capitalized earnings).
34. California State Auto. Ass'n v. Smyth, 77 F. Supp. 181 (NJ). Cal. 1948),

rev'd on other grounds, 175 F.2d. 752 (9th Cir. 1949); Coeur d'Alene Country

1156

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1149

the Treasury Regulations provide that an organization will not be
considered as organized exclusively for exempt purposes under
section 501(c)(3) "if its articles or the law of the State in which
it was created provide that its assets would, upon dissolution, be
distributed to its members or shareholders." 85 The efficacy of this
regulation is doubtful in jurisdictions where nonprofit organization statutes provide for distribution of assets at dissolution in
accordance with the articles or by-laws of the organization, 0 since
they could be amended immediately prior to dissolution. Although
the regulation may be less effective than a case-by-case examination of the history of each organization to determine the likelihood of future distributions of income, it does recognize an evident
truth: The "organizational" purposes test rather than the "benefit" clause must be relied upon in denying exemption because of the
possibility of future, illicit distributions of income. Thus, in this
area, as in the area of present distributions, the propriety of the distribution can be determined only with reference to the purpose for
which exemption was granted.
III. BENEFIT INFERRED FROM PROFIT-MAKING
ACTIVITIES
Although the legislative history indicates that the benefit
clause was apparently aimed at restricting the use of an exempt
organization's income, courts in a number of cases have professed
to infer a prohibited inurement of earnings to private benefit from
the nature of the organization's profit-making activities, even
Club v. Viley, 64 F Supp. 540 (D. Idaho 1946); Kansas City Hay Dealers' Ass'n
v Crooks, 28 F.2d 909 (W.D. Mo. 1928), aff'd, 37 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1929); Mill
Lane Club, Inc., 23 T.C. 483 (1954), acq., 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 5; Anderson
Country Club, Inc., 2 T.C. 1238 (1943), acq., 1944 Cum. BuLL. 2; Miss Hams'
Florida School, Inc., 9 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 418 (1940). See also Rev Rul. 501,
1958-2 Cum. BuLL.262, 264 ("Every social and recreational group has a prospect of eventually being disbanded and dissolved. Therefore, the fact that the
assets of a club will, upon dissolution, be paid to members or shareholders is
not alone sufficient to make the organization liable to render income tax returns."). In Uniform Printing & Supply Co., 9 B.T.A. 251 (1927), afj'd, 33 F.2d
445 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 280 US. 591 (1929), a contrary result was reached;
it might be justified, however, on the ground that the -taxpayer was not in fact
a business league, but was engaged in a -business "ordinarily carred on for
profit." See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1958); Rice & Rice, supra note 24,
at 16.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (1958).
36. E.g., AMw. STAT. § 317.57(2) (1961): "[W]here the articles or bylaws of
the dissolving corporation, or the rules or canons of a superior body or entity
by which the dissolving corporation is bound, provide for a particular distribution of the property and assets of the dissolving corporation, the property and
assets shall -be distributed accordingly"
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though no private individual or shareholder within the meaning of
the Code 7 received any benefit. This part of the Note will show
that the common characteristic of those cases was that the organization's profit-making activities were beyond the scope of the
purposes for which exemption was granted; therefore, the denial
of exemption in such cases might more properly be based upon
violation of the "purposes" clause.
In three cases3 8 involving taxpayers seeking classification as
"business leagues," exempt under predecessors of section 501(c) (6),
the Board of Tax Appeals held that various services provided
members at less than cost constituted an inurement of net earnings to private benefit. The net earnings had accrued to the organizations from the sale to nonmembers of goods and services,
including: management of bankrupt properties; 9 bill collecting; 40
and life insurance and scientific research." The benefits respectively received by the members included: credit information; education of employees with respect to credit practices, public relations work directed toward the prompt payment of debts and
the promotion of honesty; and the promotion of fair dealing in
trade through the inspection and weighing of particular commodities. These benefits would appear to stem from activities "directed
to the improvement of business conditions" in a line of business,
rather than the performance of particular services for individuals;
therefore, the conferral of benefit was within the scope of the taxexempt purpose of a business league,'4 for any benefit to members
in their private capacities was incidental to achievement of the
organization's tax-exempt purpose.s If these organizations were
to have been denied exemption, it should not have been done on
the ground that their net earnings inured to the benefit of private
37. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
38. Retailers Credit Ass'n, 33 B.T.A. 1166 (1936), aff'd, 90 F2d 47 (9th
Cir. 1937); Fort Worth Grain,& Cotton Exch., 27 B.T.A. 983 (1933); Northwestern Jobbers' Credit Bureau, 14 B.T.A 362 (1928), af'd, 37 F2d 880 (8th

Cir. 1930).
39. Northwestern Jobbers' Credit Bureau, 14 B.T.A. 362 (1928).
40. Retailers Credit Ass'n, 33 B.TA. 1166 (1936).
41. Fort Worth Grain &Cotton Exch., 27 B.TA. 983 (1933).
42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1958).
43. Moreover, in the Retailers Credit Assen case all earnings were derived
from dealings with members. It has been stated in dicta in several cases that
the forbidden private benefit does not arise in such circumstances. See West
Side Tennis Club v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
674 (1940); Jockey Club v. Helvering, 76 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1935); California
State Auto. Ass'n v. Smyth, 77 F. Supp. 131 (NfD. Cal. 1948), rev'd on other
grounds, 175 Fad 752 (9th Cir. 1949).
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individuals or shareholders, but that the organizations were not
in fact business leagues within now section 501(c)(6), since a
substantial purpose of each was "to engage in a regular business
of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit."4 4
A similar misapplication of the benefit clause has occurred in
cases involving the exemption of clubs under the predecessors of
section 501(c)(7). In Jockey Club v. Helvenng,4 exemption was
denied a club that derived substantial net earnings from the operation of a race track. The court held that where a club derives
income from "outsiders" over a sufficiently lengthy period to
justify the conclusion that the derivation of profit is "deliberate,"
the club violates the statutory prohibition against inurement of
net earnings to private benefit. Since all of the earnings were devoted to the Club's tax-exempt purpose of providing pleasure,
recreation, and other similar benefits to its members, 40 the decision might better be based on the ground that the taxpayer was
not in fact a section 501(c)(7) "club" because one of its substantial purposes was the operation of a race track for profit. That
this was substantially what the court itself had in mind in articulating its test is indicated by the emphasis it placed upon the intent of the Club to engage in business for profit rather than upon
the disposition of the resulting profit.
The same courts that decided Jockey Club reached the same
result in a similar fact situation in West Side Tennis Club.47 The
taxpayer, having derived considerable income from national tennis tournaments held on its property, was denied exemption partly
in reliance upon Jockey Club and partly upon the ground that
taxpayer was not operated for exempt purposes. The case suggests two comments: First, the income derived by the Club from
hosting the tournaments, like the income from the race track in
Jockey Club, was used exclusively to finance the club activities
that constituted the basis for exemption under section 501(c)(7);
hence earnings did not inure to the benefit of members in their
"private" capacities, but only as beneficiaries and users of the
services and facilities provided by the Club pursuant to its taxexempt purpose. Second, the Second Circuit stated by way of
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1958). One of the three cases was affirmed

on that limited ground. Retailers Credit Ass'n v Commissioner, 00 F.2d 47
(9th Cir. 1937).
45. 76 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1935), affirming 30 B.T.A. 670 (1934).
46. See INT. REv CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(7) and Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)

(7)-l (1958) for the scope of exemption of social clubs.
47. 39 B.TA. 149 (1939), aff'd, 111 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. dened, 311 U.S.
674 (1940).
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dictum that the Club might have sold or leased a portion of the
property which it had originally acquired for tax-exempt purposes and devoted the proceeds of such conveyance to the support
of those purposes without losing its exempt status, so long as the
proceeds constituted only incidental, trifling, or non-recurrent
contributions to income. This dictum, with its emphasis upon the
nature of the profit-making activity and the magnitude of the
profit, rather than upon the disposition of the profit, seems to
indicate tacit recognition by the court that its decision was actually based on the failure of the Club to be "operated exclusively
for pleasure, recreation, and other non-profitable purposes."48
The theory of private benefit espoused in Jockey Club and
West Side Tennis Club has been rejected in other cases involving
clubs where the destination or disposition of income was no different.49 In Santee Club v. White5 a club organized to purchase
and maintain lands as a hunting, fishing, and health resort for its
members sold a small portion of its property at a gain after having
held and devoted it to exempt purposes for thirty years. The sale
was made because the growth of food-killing weeds on the land
had made it useless for the Club's purposes. The proceeds of the
sale were used for improvements on other parts of the Club's
property and for general club purposes. Notwithstanding that
there was no apparent distinction between the Santee Club, the
Jockey Club, and the West Side Tennis Club with respect to the
use of earnings, the Santee Club was held tax exempt. The First
Circuit, implicitly rejecting the reasoning of Jockey Club, stated
that in Santee "no part of the profit on the sale of real estate in
question inured to the benefit of the Club's shareholders except
through their use of the Club's facilities, which is clearly not the
benefit referred to in the exempting clause of the statute .... "5,
What does seem to distinguish Santee from the other two clubs is
that its net earnings arose from the sale of real estate that had been
purchased many years before to implement its exempt purposes,
had been devoted to those purposes while held, and was sold only
because it was no longer useful for those purposes. Thus, every
transaction of the Club with respect to the property in question
48. xTh. Plv. CoDE OF 1954, § 501(c)(7).
49. See California State Auto. Ass'n v. Smyth, 77 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal.
1948), rev'd on other grounds, 175 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1949); Anderson Country
Club, The., 2 T.C. 1938 (1943), acq., 1944 Cum. BuLL,. 2; Town &Country Club,
1942 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 42672; I.T. 3302, 1939-2 Cmr. BuiL. 105;
G.CiM. 19465, 1938-1 Cum. BuLL. 172.
50. 87 Fad 5 (lst Cir.), reversing 13 F. Supp. 816 (D. Mass. 1936).

51. 87 Fad at 7.

1160

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1149

was incidental to promotion of the Club's tax-exempt purposes.52
Hence, unlike the other two cases, a purpose to operate the Club
for profit could not reasonably be inferred from the profit-making
activity in Santee. Results similar to Santee were subsequently
reached by the Fifth Circuit in two cases involving clubs that
granted oil leases on portions of their properties; 58 the court recognized quite clearly that it was dealing with a problem of income
source rather than conferral of benefit.
The distinction between problems of income source and conferral of benefit was again confused in Aination Club v. Commissioner,54 a Tenth Circuit case after Santee Club, but certain statements in the court's opinion shed some light on the basis of the
confusion. In Aviation Club the Club had engaged in a "substantial and continuing" business for profit that was beyond the scope
of its tax-exempt purposes, and the net earnings were used to purchase furniture and equipment for the clubhouse and to make
extensive plans for the improvement of club property. The Tenth
Circuit relied upon West Side Tennis and Jockey Club in holding
that business activities of the club had produced the forbidden
inurement of net earnings to private benefit. It then proceeded
to distinguish between two situations: an otherwise exempt organization that operates a "substantial and continuing" business,
the net earnings of which are used by the organization to support
its exempt activities; and an organization that operates a business
for profit, all of the net earnings of which do not and cannot inure
to the benefit of its members, but must be used to support and
maintain a wholly exempt organization. 5 The court said that
52. Cf. Mill Lane Club, Inc., 23 T.C. 433 (1954), acq., 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 5;
Anderson Country Club, Inc., 2 T.C. 1288 (1943), acq., 1944 Cum. BULL. 2
(purchase, holding, and sale of property incidental to club purpose); Town &
Country Club, 1942 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. Dec.
42672; Juniper Hunting
Club, Inc., 28 B.T.A. 525 (1933) (exemption denied where 'sale of club property
dictated primarily 'by desire to realize profit); Unity School of Christianity,
4 B.T.A. 61 (1926), acq., VI-1 Cum. BULL. 6 (1927) (operation of vegetarian
restaurant, farm to supply restaurant, and religious publishing house incidental
to religious purposes); Rev Rul. 501, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 262 (sale of club
property to facilitate dissolution not motivated by desire to realize profit is
incidental 'to tax-exempt purposes); G.C.M. 19465, 1938-1 CUM. BULL. 172.
53. Scofield v. Corpus Christi Golf &Country Club, 127 F.2d 452 (5th Cir.
1942), 27 lMu. L. REv 98; Koon Kreek Klub v. Thomas, 108 Fd oO (5th
Cir. 1939).

54. 162 F2d 984 (10th Cir. 1947), affirmng 7 T.C. 377 (1946), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 837 (1947).
55. A third class of cases discussed by Avation Club were those where
revenue was derived from isolated transactions as in Santee. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra. The court said that these organizations, like those
m the second category, would be exempt.
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organizations in the second category were exempt, while those in
the first were not.
The reason that the court placed Aviation Club in the first
category, concluding that net earnings in that case inured to private benefit, and that the courts in West Side Tennis Club and
Jockey Club so readily found private benefit may perhaps be
better understood by an examination of the cases placed by the
Aviation Club court in the second category, since the only difference between the two categories appears to be the legal conclusion
in one that there was private benefit and in the other that there
was not. The second category originated in Trinidad v. Sagrada
Orden de Predicadores,N the basic decision of the United States
Supreme Court with respect to exempt organizations. Trinidad
involved a religious order that received investment income in the
form of rent, dividends, interest, and capital gains and business
income in the form of revenue from sales to its members of chocolate, wine, and other articles apparently used by them in the performance of their religious, educational, and charitable functions.
In discusiing the effect of the organization's receipt of investment
income upon exemption, the Court noted that the destination
or use of such income was made controlling by the benefit clause.
When the Court turned to a consideration of business income,
however, it was not content to rely simply upon the fact that the
business income was used to support tax-exempt purposes; instead, it emphasized that the organization had not actually engaged in trade "in any proper sense of the term" since it had not
sold to the public or in competition with others, since the merchandise was used by members of the organization for purposes
incidental to the organization's tax-exempt purposes, and since
the organization did not intend that the sales produce profit. 7
Subsequent decisions, overlooking the fact that the Trinidad
Court used the destination test only with respect to investment
income, misapplied the test to business income. Two rules evolved:
56. 263 US. 578 (1924).
57. The distinction which the Supreme Court intimated between investment or passive income, on the one hand, and income derived from trade or
business, on the other, is not without rational foundation. It is reflected in
N
-T. RL-v. CODE OF 1954, §§ 501(C)(2) (exemption of corporations organized for
exclusive purpose of -holding title to property, collecting income therefrom,
and paying income, less expenses, to exempt organization), 512(b) (exempting dividends, interest, annuities, royalties, most real property rents, and capital
gains from tax on unrelated business income). The -basis of the distinction is
the fact that the exemption of passive income is not likely to result in serious
competition with taxable businesses having similar income. See S. REsP. No.
2375,81st Cong., ed Sess. 30-31 (1950).
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first, a "feeder" corporation, organized and operated solely to
conduct a trade or business for profit and to pay all of the income
to an organization exempt under section 501, was exempt; " and
second, an organization exempt under section 501 but whose substantial purpose was to conduct a profit-making trade or business
was nonetheless exempt, provided only that all profits were devoted to tax-exempt purposes."'
The courts, however, were unwilling to grant exemption to all
organizations enumerated in section 501 merely because business
earnings were used to further the organization's tax-exempt purpose. Some courts, ignoring the Trinidaddestination test and considering only the source of income, frankly admitted that the
requirement of organization and operation for exclusively exempt
purposes was to be more liberally construed with respect to religious, educational, and charitable organizations than others."
Other courts purported to rely on the destination test, but found
an inurement of earnings to private benefit in those cases in
which it sought to deny exemption - the benefit being inferred
from the source of the earnings. The result was that religious,
charitable, and educational organizations"' or civic leagues0 2 could
earn business income and retain their exemption but that clubs"8
or business leagues64 could not, notwithstanding that in each case
58. Roche's Beach, Inc. v Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938),
reversing 35 B.T.A. 1087 (1937); Home Oil Mill v Willingham, 68 F Supp.
525 (N.D. Ala. 1945). But see Bear Gulch Water Co. v Commissioner, 110
F.2d 975 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 652 (1941) (exemption denied where
taxpayer was bound by neither charter nor contract to pay earnings to sole
stockholder, an exempt organization, and in fact paid none); Banner Bldg. Co.,
46 B.T.A. 857 (1942) (same).
59. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v Commissioner, 148 F.2d 948 (Rd
Cir. 1945), reversing 3 T.C. 949 (1944); Bohemian Gymnastic Ass'n Sokol v
Higgins, 147 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1945); Sand Springs Home, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927),
acq., VI-I Cum. BulL. 5 (1927).
60. Bohemian Gymnastic Ass'n Sokol v Higgins, 147 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1945); cf. The Associates, 28 B.T.A. 521, 524 (1933).
61. See Bohemian Gymnastic Ass'n Sokol v Higgins, 147 F.2d 774 (Rd Cir.
1945); Roche's Beach, Inc. v Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
62. See Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v Commissioner, 148 F.Rd 948
(2d Cir. 1945).
63. See Aviation Club, 7 T.C. 377 (1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d 984 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 837 (1947); West Side Tennis Club, 39 B.T.A. 149 (1939),
aff'd, 111 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 674 (1940); Jockey Club v
Helvering, 76 F.2d 597 (Rd Cir. 1935).
64. See Retailers Credit Ass'n, 33 B.T.A. 1166 (1936), aff'd, 90 F.2d 47
(9th Cir. 1937); Fort Worth Gram & Cotton Exch., 27 B.T.A. 983 (1933);
Northwestern Jobbers' Credit Bureau, 14 B.T.A. 362 (1928), af'd, 37 F.2d 880
(8th Cir. 1980).
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the destination of the earnings was the support of the tax-exempt
purpose.
The courts' reason, then, for distingishing between the two
categories of cases enumerated in Aviation Club was to discriminate among the various section 501 organizations on the basis
of the exempt purpose to which their earnings were to be devoted.
This use of the benefit clause is not proper because the Code
clearly contemplated that a qualifying organization would retain
its exemption so long as its earnings were devoted to the purposes upon which exemption was based. In 1950 Congress legislatively overruled the destination test with respect to certain organizations: All feeder organizations were denied exemption without discriminating among them on the basis of the exempt purpose to which their earnings were to be devoted. 6 Similarly, the
net earnings of a trade or business regularly carried on by certain
enumerated organizations, the conduct of which is not substantially related to the performance by the organization of its exempt
purpose, were, with a few exceptions, made taxable 6 Since Congress has more clearly defined which exempt organizations shall
be taxed because they conduct profitable trades or businesses and
to what extent they shall be taxable, continued judicial discrimination among such organizations on the basis of what has always
been a highly dubious application of the benefit clause would
seem now to be unnecessary, if not improper.
65. See lxT. Rov. CODE OF 1954, § 502.
66. See 1wu. Rsv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 511-14. Clubs and civic leagues constitute notable exceptions to the applicability of the unrelated business taxable
income provisions. See flcr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 511(a)(2), (b)(2). Thus,
though the income of an organization "feeding" a club or civic league is taxable (see

502), it might be argued that Congress, by failing to include clubs,

civic leagues, and other organizations within § 511, manifested its intent that
such organizations remain totally exempt from tax on all income, from whatever source derived, so long as it is devoted to exempt purposes-a strict
destination test. The legislative history does not indicate the reason for the
limited applicability of § 511. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28
(1950); HR. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., ed Sess. 36 (1950); 96 CoNa. REC.
A4895 (1950) (extension of remarks of Rep. Richard M. Simpson). This would
impute to Congress the intent -to overrule sub .silenio cases such as Joclkwj
Club and West Side Tennis Club where, it has -been argued m this Note, exemption was denied because the organizations involved engaged in substantial
business activities unrelated to achievement or performance of their tax-exempt
purposes. It is submitted that it was not the intent of Congress to adopt a
strict destination test for all organizations except those subject to the unrelated
buness income tax. Rather, the purpose -would seem to have been to impose
a -taxupon the business income of certain enumerated organizations, leaving to
all other exempt organizations except those specifically exempted by § 511 (see
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CONCLUSION
In those cases in which a substantial purpose of an organization is to operate an unrelated, income-producing trade or business, the organization will now be subject to tax on one of two
grounds: If the organization is enumerated in the unrelated business income tax provisions, added in 1950, its unrelated trade and
business income will be taxable. 7 An organization which is neither
enumerated in nor specifically exempted from tax by those provisions, 8 for example, a social club, should be denied exemption
only where, because of its business operations, it fails to meet the
"purposes" test. The proposition is that the purposes test has been
and ought to be used as a basis for denying exemption to classes
of exempt organizations which are unmentioned in the unrelated
business income provisions, yet which receive substantial unrelated trade and business income, regardless of the use to which
it is devoted.
In the other class of cases discussed in this Note, those in which
objection to exemption is truly founded on the disposition rather
than the source of organizational income, the benefit clause is not
a helpful test to determine whether an organization is exempt.
This is simply because the meaning of "private shareholder or
individual" in any particular context depends wholly upon the
scope of the exempt purpose of the organization in question. If
the conferral of benefit is incidental to the performance or achievement of the organization's tax-exempt purpose, earnings clearly
have not mured to the benefit of a "private shareholder or individual" within the meaning of the Code. If the receipt of benefit is not
incidental to the performance or achievement of a tax-exempt purpose, the basis for the exemption is no longer present; it is plainly
within the contemplation of the statute that exemption be denied.
The "inurement to benefit" clause is irrelevant and ought not
to be applied to situations where the real issue is the legitimacy
of the organization's source of earnings. Moreover, where the question involves the propriety of a distribution of earnings, the benefit
clause, although relevant at first blush, in fact is surplusage, representing a conclusion rather than a test. In neither situation does
the clause serve a significant independent function in the determination of exemption.
note 68 rnfra) the prospect of forfeiting their exemptions entirely if they engage
in substantial unrelated business pursuits.
67. See INT. REv CODE OF 1954, §§ 511(a)(2), (b)(2).
68. The only organizations named as exempt from the unrelated business
income tax are churches or conventions or associations of churches. See INT.
REv CODE OF 1954, § 511(a)(2). There are, of course, other exempt orgaizations to which § 511 does not refer. See note 66 supra.

